Showing 1 - 10 of 95
This paper establishes a B-core existence result for normal form TU games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602875
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332338
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332423
In this paper we experimentally compare three implementations of Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793792
The paper considers price adjustment on the plane and derives global stability conditions for such dynamics. First, we examine the well-known Scarf Example, to obtain and analyze a global stability condition for this case. Next, for a general class of excess demand functions, a set of conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332364
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602907
The paper constructs a two-sector model of endogenous growth for a Mixed Economy characterized by two private inputs, labor and capital, and the services of an accumulable pure public input (of which an important example is infrastructure). Final goods are produced by a competitive private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466543
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472330
We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472331
O'donoghue and Zweimüller (2004, J. of Econ. Growth), a seminal work, showed that broadening leading breadth in patent protection can stimulate innovation. However, the empirical literature has consistently found skeptical results on the positive effect. To fill the gap, we build another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540400