We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

We analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message and the receiver voluntarily pays money for the...

We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contest where agents' actions are strategic complements and where their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. The following results are obtained: i) if the...

We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem in which the agent's effort in each period has strong persistent effects. We show that a simple contract, where the reward depends only on the final outcome, is explained as the optimal contract derived in the principal's optimization problem. The...

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public...

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We...

Previous theoretical researches show that learning from good performers yields intense competition and results in the low profitability of firms. These researchers do not take into account differentiation strategies being referred as a useful strategic tool to mitigate competition. We introduce...

We investigate the entry timing and location decisions under market-size uncertainty with Brownian motions in a continuous-time spatial competition duopoly model a la d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Under a sequential equilibrium, the threshold of the follower non-monotonically increases in...

We develop an evolutionary game model to reveal the theoretical basis for the assignment of property right, where both plaintiff and defendant argue for their rights by claiming their reliance investment.We allow for the possibility that the value of the total product depend not only on the...