The class of double-crossing preferences, where signaling is cheaper for higher types than for lower types at low signaling levels and the opposite is true at high signaling levels, underlines the phenomenon of countersignaling. We show that under the D1 refinement, the equilibrium signaling...

This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under doublecrossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a...

This paper examines the effects of school curricula on subsequent preference formation. The estimation results, using Japanese data, show that the actual curriculum at public elementary schools varies widely from area to area and is associated with preference formation. Specifically, pupils who...

We study the contribution of health-related behaviors to the health education gradient by distinguishing between short-run and long-run mediating effects: while in the former only behaviors in the immediate past are taken into account, in the latter we consider the entire history of behaviors....

We study the contribution of health-related behaviors to the health education gradient by distinguishing between short-run and long-run mediating effects: while in the former only behaviors in the immediate past are taken into account, in the latter we consider the entire history of behaviors....

This paper compares the Italian and the Japanese education systems and looks at the interaction between these systems and labour market outcomes. We model the Japanese labour market, characterised by the limited labour turnover and by the emphasis on hiring straight from school, and the Italian...

We consider a "tenure-clock problem" in which a principal may set a deadline by which she needs to evaluate an agent's ability and decides whether to promote him or not. We embed this problem in a continuous-time model with both hidden action and hidden information, where the principal must...

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information regarding demand uncertainty. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg games, a leader's private information becomes public information among followers. This study demonstrates that the strategic...

While political correctness is a dominant norm in many public situations, we also observe behaviors that are apparently "politically incorrect", often from professionals and experts. This paper examines the flip side of political correctness as analyzed in Morris (2001) to shed some light on the...