Showing 1 - 10 of 166
We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332402
We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013674
We analyze a cheap talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, in each period, the sender sends a cheap talk message and the receiver voluntarily pays money for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901585
We consider implementability and the welfare effects of a partial announcement policy using a model of a beauty contest where agents' actions are strategic complements and where their decisions on public information acquisition are endogenous. The following results are obtained: i) if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856822
In this paper we analyse scoring auctions with general non-quasilinear scoring rules. We assume that cost function of … the following. (i) Equilibria in scoring auctions can be computed without any endogeneity problems and we get explicit … first-score and second-score auctions. (iii) We show that such properties and rankings depend on the curvature properties of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052249
When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332494
Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011421509
Auctions are a popular and prevalent form of trading mechanism, despite the restriction that the seller cannot price … pervasive use of auctions in practice. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332208
auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332235
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332270