We analyze the rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospectivepayment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes...

We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes...

Using a model where a monopoly chooses its commodity's quality as well as its quantity, we consider optimal regulation whenthe monopoly's costs are unknown to the regulator. Regarding quantity and quality, the results are a natural extension of Baron and Myerson (1982): the levels of quantity...

It is often touted that decisiveness is one of the most important qualities to be possessed by leaders, broadly defined. To see how and why decisiveness can be a valuable asset in organizations, we construct a model of strategic information transmission where: (i) a decision maker solicits...

This paper explores the consequences and implications of the dual role of promotion in an environment where a firm must simultaneously achieve two distinct goals - assignment and incentive provision - via the strategic use of promotions. We argue that the efficient promotion rule is generally...

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a 'two-tier equilibrium' in which 'reputable' auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

In dynamic principal-agent relationships, it is sometimes observed that the agent's reward depends only on the final outcome. For example, a student's grade in a course quite often depends only on the final exam score, where the performance in the problem sets and the mid-term exam is ignored....

The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.