Showing 1 - 10 of 144
In the marriage problem (two-sided one-to-one matching problem), it is well-known that the weak core, the strong core and the set of stable matchings are all equivalent. This paper generalizes the above observation considering the G-weak core and the G-strong core. These are core concepts in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332335
This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332338
In this paper we experimentally compare three implementations of Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793792
We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332345
We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms-the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms-in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that-in line with the theory-in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350
We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms - the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms - in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that - in line with the theory -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220116
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472330
We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472331
O'donoghue and Zweimüller (2004, J. of Econ. Growth), a seminal work, showed that broadening leading breadth in patent protection can stimulate innovation. However, the empirical literature has consistently found skeptical results on the positive effect. To fill the gap, we build another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540400
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Nash program by experimentally comparing the results of "structured" (non-cooperative) demand-based and offer-based mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540408