The observability of partners' past play is known to theoretically improve cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game under random matching. This paper presents evidence from an incentivized experiment that reputational information per se may not improve cooperation. A...

We compare male and female behavior in Japan and Canada in the context of a threshold public goods game with both a strong free-riding equilibrium and many socially efficient threshold equilibria. Although higher rewards produce higher contributions, neither culture nor gender has any...

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's...

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other’s...

This paper argues that currently advanced, aging economies experienced a qualitative change in the role of public education during the process of industrialization. In the early phases of the Industrial Revolution, public education was regarded as a duty that regulated child labor and thereby...

This paper studies allocation correspondences in the house allocation problems with collective initial endowments. We examine the implications of two axioms, namely 'consistency' and 'unanimity.' Consistency requires the allocation correspondence be invariant under reductions of population....

This paper considers collective decision-making when individuals are partitioned into groups (e.g., states or parties) endowed with voting weights. We study a game in which each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its...

This paper considers collective decision-making when individuals are partitioned into groups (e.g., states or parties) endowed with voting weights. We study a game in which each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its...

Succeeding Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1995) and Saijo, Tatamitani and Yamato (1995), we define several conditions of natural mechanisms in production economies, and proposed two types of natural mechanisms, that is, the quantity and price-quantity types.

This paper presents data from experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries.