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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209
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An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2008
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053961
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College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study
Pais, Joana; Pintér, Agnes; Veszteg, Róbert F. - 2008
We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms-the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms-in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350
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College Admissions and the Role of Information : An Experimental Study
Pinter, Agnes; Veszteg, Robert Ferec; Pais, Joana - 2008
We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms - the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms - in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220116
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Toward an understanding of dominated bidding in a Vickrey auction experiment
Serizawa, Shigehiro; Shimada, Natsumi; Tse, Tiffany Tsz Kwan - 2024
This study explores two key factors influencing subjects' deviation from domi- nant bidding in Vickrey auction experiments. The first factor examines subjects' understanding of strategy-proofness (SP), while the second focuses on "human interaction" which includes social preferences (spite and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540475
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A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; … - 2019
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430002
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The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Mikami, Ryo; Sakai, Toyotaka; … - 2020
We conducted laboratory experiments for the multi-unit Vickrey auction with and without advice to subjects on strategy-proofness. The rate of truth-telling among the subjects without advice was 20%, whereas the rate increased to 47% among those who received advice. By conducting similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012544001
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The Problem of Multiple Commons : A Market Design Approach
Tierney, Ryan - 2017
There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. We assign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964419
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Mechanism Design Without Quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya - 2017
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model:(1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954673
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Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Mechanism Design : Ex-Post Revenue Maximization With Non-Quasilinear Preferences
Kazumura, Tomoya - 2020
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854303