The leading economic explanation for tipping - that is, explanation why the practice is socially beneficial, not why individuals leave tips even though it is not narrowly advantageous to them - is that it confers an incentive to provide personal services. This fits many instances in which...

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1)...

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

We study how high-frequency traders (HFTs) strategically decide their speed level in a market with a random speed bump. If HFTs recognize the market impact of their speed decision, they perceive a wider bid-ask spread as an endogenous upward-sloping cost of being faster. We find that the speed...

Previous studies have stressed that in ation dynamics exhibit a substantial disper- sion across sectors. Using US producer price data, we present evidence that sectoral in ation persistence is negatively correlated with market concentration, which is diffi- cult to reconcile with the prediction...

At the aggregate level, the evidence that deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) are too persistent to be explained solely by nominal rigidities has long been a puzzle (Rogoff, 1996). Another puzzle from the micro price evidence of the law of one price (LOP), which is the basic building...

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post...

This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model:(1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

The leading economic explanation for tipping - that is, explanation why the practice is socially beneficial, not why individuals leave tips even though it is not narrowly advantageous to them - is that it confers an incentive to provide personal services. This fits many instances in which...