We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger,...

Theory shows that vertical integration has contrasting two effects, efficiency and foreclosure effects. This study empirically estimates the relative size of these two effects. Unlike previous studies, I focus on a single vertical merger in order to use a panel dataset, and estimate its average...

We provide a theoretical framework to discuss the relation between market size and vertical structure in the railway industry. The framework is based on a simple downstream monopoly model with two input suppliers, labor forces and the rail infrastructure firm. The operation of the downstream...

We provide a simple model to investigate decisions on vertical integration/separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final products of the local downstream monopolists. Depending on their cost structure, downstream firms' decisions on vertical...

We explore why authority within firms helps trading parties immediately settle ex post adaptation problems despite the possibility of a subordinate's disobedience to the orders of his boss. By employing three crucial behavioral assumptions (reference-dependent preference, self-serving bias, and...

This paper studies how a retailer decides the length of product line in a vertically related industry. We study a market with two product varieties. Each retailer decides the number of varieties it procures from an upstream manufacturer. The manufacturer may open an online store and encroach on...

I revisit supplier encroachment under the framework of a two-part tariff contract. When a monopoly manufacturer supplies competing retailers and each retailer's contracting process is unobservable to the rival, the retailer's lack of knowledge vis-à-vis its rival's contract may undermine the...

We consider a bilateral monopoly in which a manufacturer can open its direct channel that is less efficient than the existing retailer. We find the following results. The manufacturer opens its direct channel if its bargaining power over the existing retailer is weak. Opening the direct channel...

We consider a bilateral monopoly with a supplier and a buyer. Their trading terms are determined through negotiations, but affected by the buyer's efforts to search for outside suppliers. We find surprisingly that a market expansion may harm the supplier.

We analyze firms' decisions to adopt a vertical integrated or decentralized structure taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains, where R&D is conducted by upstream sectors. R&D investment determines the...