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Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

van Damme, Eric; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1999

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334682

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

Weibull, Jörgen W.; van Damme, Eric - 1998

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334690

What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?

Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1997

framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to … economic theory has lead to new predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion will be focused on the … in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges for evolutionary game theory in economics? …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334821