Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334653
This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and functionally independent of risk-dominance relations. As the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334873
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334998
This thesis consists of one essay in industrial organization and two essays in non-cooperative game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334644
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334682
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334690
Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335048
We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. By taking the social network connecting agents as given, we study the subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320170
This paper reviews a growing literature investigating how economic agents may learn rational expectations. Fully rational learning requires implausible initial information assumptions, therefore some form of bounded rationality has come into focus. Such learning models often converge to rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334730