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Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games

Banerjee, Abhijit; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1996

This paper examines equilibrium and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2 x 2 coordination games. This set is finite and functionally independent of risk-dominance relations. As the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334873

An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory

Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334998

Multi-Market Competition and Coordination in Games

Ganslandt, Mattias - 1997

This thesis consists of one essay in industrial organization and two essays in non-cooperative game theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334644

Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems

Vieille, Nicolas; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2002

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334653

Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players

Banerjee, Abhijit; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334668

Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

van Damme, Eric; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1999

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334682

Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

Weibull, Jörgen W.; van Damme, Eric - 1998

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334690

Internal Efficiency and External Conditions

Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1997

This paper develops a new analytical approach to the old question whether market conditions may influence the internal efficiency of firms. The basic textbook model of the firm is slightly extended to incorporate managers' incentives to reduce production costs in an imperfectly competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334797

What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?

Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1997

framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to … economic theory has lead to new predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion will be focused on the … in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges for evolutionary game theory in economics? …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334821

Explaining Parallel Mobile Telephone Networks: A Theoretical Model

Segendorff, Björn - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334882