This paper develops a property rights-based view of strategy (the “PRV”). A property right (or economic right) is an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of an asset (including, e.g., a monopoly position) or consume it indirectly...

This paper is taken up with discussing the extent to which existing economic theories of the firm are helpful for constructing what Rumelt called a "strategic theory of the firm". Such a theory explains the existence, boundaries, organization and competitive advantage of the firm. The modern...

We address the closely related phenomena of corporate venturing and spin-offs in the context of organizational economics, for example, agency perspectives and the evolutionary perspective on firms. These perspectives allow us to say something about both the amount and nature of variety creation...

We analyze a key problem in organization theory and design, namely the potential tension between authority (i.e., the power to make decisions which guide the decisions of another person) and the discretion of employees (i.e., the ability of an agent to control resources including his own human...

We address the issue of promoting synergies in divisionalized, diversified firms from the perspectives of the resource-based view and recent work on corporate headquarters, thus connecting the analysis of sustained competitive advantage with organizational issues. We begin by clarifying the...

It has recently been argued by a number of writers that the evolutionary theory of the firm is a genuine theoretical rival to the contractual theory of the firm. This paper presents a reconstruction of the evolutionary theory of the firm. A taxonomy developed by the Polish philosopher Krajewski...