repayments (default). Firms in Italy defaulted more against banks with high levels of past losses. We control for borrower … fundamentals with firm-quarter fixed effects; thus, identification comes from a firm's choice to default against one bank versus … bank relationships comes into doubt …

Even after controlling for local economic conditions, differences in state bank supervision and regulation contribute … toward explaining the large variation in state bank suspension rates across U.S. counties during the Great Depression. More … requirements had the opposite effect. States that endowed bank supervisors with the authority to liquidate banks minimized …

how bank supervision and regulation affected banking stability during the Great Depression. In response to well …-organized interest groups and public concern over the bank failures of the 1920s, many U.S. states adopted supervisory and regulatory … liquidate banks quickly experienced higher state bank suspension rates from 1929 to 1933 …

We show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked. A bailout benefits the economy …-financial sector to fund the bailout may be inefficient since it weakens its incentive to invest, decreasing growth. Instead, the … sovereign may choose to fund the bailout by diluting existing government bondholders, resulting in a deterioration of the …

.5 percentage points due to weak-bank attachment, representing between 8% and 36% of aggregate job losses …

monetary policy. The theory unifies an endogenous supply of illiquid local loans and risk-sharing among subsidiaries of bank …

A lending boom is reflected in the composition of bank liabilities when traditional retail deposits (core liabilities …

Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences …? Our analysis of Korea's 1997-99 crisis, suggests an answer: No. Despite a general "no bailout" policy during the crisis …