Similar Search Results

Decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? : an empirical test

Dreher, Axel (contributor); … - 2007

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003604502

Formal institutions and subjective well-being : revisiting the cross-country evidence

Bjørnskov, Christian (contributor); … - 2008

A long tradition in economics explores the association between the quality of formal institutions and economic performance. The literature on the relationship between such institutions and happiness is, however, rather limited. In this paper, we revisit the findings from recent cross-country...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003672559

The Spread of Anti-Trafficking Policies : Evidence from a New Index

Cho, Seo-Young - 2011

We analyze the spread of policies dealing with international trafficking in human beings. Arguing that countries are unlikely to make independent choices, we identify pressure, externalities and learning or emulation as plausible diffusion mechanisms for spatial dependence in anti-trafficking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128229

Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

Dreher, Axel - 2009

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158510

The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?

Dreher, Axel - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146478

Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending : Theory and Empirical Evidence

Marchesi, Silvia - 2014

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750944

Corruption and the Shadow Economy : An Empirical Analysis

Dreher, Axel; Schneider, Friedrich - 2021

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318034