Similar Search Results

Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending : Theory and Empirical Evidence

Marchesi, Silvia - 2014

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750944

Why it pays for aid recipients to take note of the millennium challenge corporation: Other donors do!

Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Öhler, Hannes - 2010

It is widely believed that the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has grossly fallen short of high expectations raised by the Bush administration in 2002. From the perspective of potential recipient countries, the crucial issue is whether the MCC increased the overall pool of aid resources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302718

Are 'new' donors different? Comparing the allocation of bilateral aid between non-DAC and DAC donor

Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Thiele, Rainer - 2010

Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. On the other hand, new donors (many of which were aid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302719

The Spread of Anti-Trafficking Policies : Evidence from a New Index

Cho, Seo-Young - 2011

We analyze the spread of policies dealing with international trafficking in human beings. Arguing that countries are unlikely to make independent choices, we identify pressure, externalities and learning or emulation as plausible diffusion mechanisms for spatial dependence in anti-trafficking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128229

Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

Dreher, Axel - 2009

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158510

The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?

Dreher, Axel - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146478

Corruption and the Shadow Economy : An Empirical Analysis

Dreher, Axel; Schneider, Friedrich - 2021

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a crosssection of 120 countries and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318034

Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme

Öhler, Hannes; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Dreher, Axel - 2010

Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302714

Aid allocation by German NGOs: Does the degree of public refinancing matter?

Dreher, Axel; Nunnenkamp, Peter; Thiel, Susann; Thiele, … - 2010

Using a new dataset for 41 German non-governmental organizations (NGOs), we analyze the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries in a Tobit regression framework. By identifying for each NGO the degree of public refinancing, we address the largely unresolved issue of whether financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302715

The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Raymond, James; Werker, Eric - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302713