There is no robust empirical support for the effect of financial incentives on the decision towork in self-employment rather than as a wage earner. In the literature, this is seen as apuzzle. We offer a focus on the opportunity cost, i.e. the wages given up as an employee.Information on income...

There is no robust empirical support for the effect of financial incentives on the decision to work in self-employment rather than as a wage earner. In the literature, this is seen as a puzzle. We offer a focus on the opportunity cost, i.e. the wages given up as an employee. Information on...

Firms hiring fresh graduates face uncertainty on the future productivity of workers. Intuitively, one expects starting wages to reflect this. Formal analysis supports the intuition. We use the dispersion of exam grades within a field of education as an indicator of the heterogeneity that...

We use two large Dutch datasets to estimate the Risk Augmented Mincer equation and test for risk compensation in expected earnings. We replicate earlier findings of a positive premium for risk and a negative premium for skew and add confirmation of the key results if we control for individual...

How valuable are cognitive and social abilities for entrepreneurs' incomes as compared to employees? We answer three questions: (1) To what extent does a composite measure of ability affect an entrepreneur's earnings relative to employees? (2) Do different cognitive abilities (e.g. math ability,...

It is argued that migration from Mexico to the US and its corresponding return migration aredetermined by international wage differentials and preferences for origin. We use a model ofjob search, savings and migration to show that job turnover is a crucial determinant of themigration process...

Using a matched firm-worker dataset, we show both theoretically and empirically that positiveassortative matching between firms...

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within therealm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme,the agent's optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure...

We compare the returns to education (RTE) for entrepreneurs and employees, based on 19waves of the NLSY database. By using instrumental variable techniques (IV) and takingaccount of selectivity, we find that the RTE are significantly higher for entrepreneurs than foremployees (18.3 percent and...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expectedto be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompetingexplanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of boardmonitoring is hidden in stock price...