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Subjective Performance Evaluation and Inequality Aversion

Grund, Christian; Przemeck, Judith - 2021

Many firms use subjective performance appraisal systems due to lack of objective performance measures. In these cases, supervisors usually have to rate the performance of their subordinates. Using such systems, it is a well established fact that many supervisors tend to assess the employees too...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324841

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2021

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324885

Team Governance : Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316729

Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope

Roider, Andreas - 2021

This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project's scope before some later decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316757

Feedback in Tournaments Under Commitment Problems : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2021

In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316760

Agency in Health-Care : Are Medical Care-Givers Perfect Agents?

Neuman, Einat; Neuman, Shoshana - 2021

It has been suggested in the literature that a source of incompleteness in the agency relationship between the doctor and the patient is that the provider may respond to an incomplete or biased perception of the patient's interests. However, this has not been shown empirically. This paper is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317135

Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix : Theory and Evidence

Frederiksen, Anders; Takáts, Előd - 2021

Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of incentives, such as fixed … wages, bonus payments, promotion options, and layoff threats. In general, economists understand how incentives motivate … an optimal contract. In particular, we show that it can be optimal for firms to combine cost-efficient incentives such as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317331

Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity

Bayo Moriones, José Alberto - 2015

the use of individual and group incentives boost intensity, whereas plant or firm pay for performance do not seem to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016242

The Moral Hazard of Lifesaving Innovations : Naloxone Access, Opioid Abuse, and Crime

Doleac, Jennifer L. - 2018

The United States is experiencing an epidemic of opioid abuse. In response, many states have increased access to naloxone, a drug that can save lives when administered during an overdose. However, naloxone access may unintentionally increase opioid abuse through two channels: (1) reducing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920429

Ambulance Utilization in New York City after the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act

Courtemanche, Charles - 2018

Expanding insurance coverage could, by insulating patients from having to pay full cost, encourage the utilization of arguably unnecessary medical services. It could also eliminate (or at least diminish) the need for emergency services through increasing access to preventive care. Using publicly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922443