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Tacit Lobbying Agreements : An Experimental Study

Großer, Jens - 2011

of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on low …-tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful …% of societies with finitely-repeated encounters. However, lobbying investments are not always profitable, and profit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132418

The Efficacy and Efforts of Interest Groups in Post Elections Policy Formation

Epstein, Gil S. - 2012

what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition … discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096476

Economic Science and Political Influence

Saint-Paul, Gilles - 2013

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088344

Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention

Balles, Patrick - 2018

Asymmetric information between voters and legislative representatives poses a major challenge to the functioning of representative democracy. We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906525

Integration, Labor Market Regulation, Lobbying, and Technological Change

Palokangas, Tapio - 2009

This paper examines an economic union where oligopolistic firms produce by skilled and unskilled labor and do in-house Ramp;D by skilled labor. The planner of the union accepts new members to the union, regulates the labor market through a minimum wage for unskilled labor and supports firms by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764074

Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation

Epstein, Gil S. - 2014

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061935

Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power

Bellani, Luna; Fabella, Vigile Marie; Scervini, Francesco - 2021

. The two dimensions provide an opportunity to trade off one policy over another to make the lobbying opposition less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314863

Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms : The Role of Country Asymmetries

Pflüger, Michael - 2010

This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies with heterogeneous firms. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134819

Inequality and Trade Policy : Pro-Poor Bias of Contemporary Trade Restrictions

Ural Marchand, Beyza P. - 2019

This paper studies the pro-poor bias of contemporary trade policy in India by estimating the household welfare effects of eliminating the current protection structure. The elimination of a pro-poor trade policy is expected to have lower welfare gains or higher welfare loss at the low end of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870281

Labor Market Regulation, International Trade and Footloose Capital

Palokangas, Tapio - 2017

I examine the effects of globalization in countries where the employed workers support the unemployed and the governments control wages by regulating the workers' relative bargaining power. I use a general oligopolistic equilibrium model of two integrated countries with two inputs: labor and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965021

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