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Parsons, Donald O. - 2013

Severance pay, a fixed-sum payment to workers at job separation, has been the focus of intense policy concern for the last several decades, but much of this concern is unearned. The design of the ideal separation package is outlined and severance pay emerges as a natural component of job...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074589

The Economics of Severance Pay

Boeri, Tito - 2013

All OECD countries have either legally mandated severance pay or compensations imposed by industry-level bargaining in case of employer initiated job separations. According to the extensive literature on Employment Protection Legislation such transfers are either ineffective or highly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079741

Social Comparisons in Wage Delegation : Experimental Evidence

Charness, Gary - 2013

workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm …. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect … workers' performance. Moreover, the relative effect of discrimination in relation to decision rights is larger than in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071433

Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation

Kräkel, Matthias - 2018

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929070

Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope

Roider, Andreas - 2021

This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project's scope before some later decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316757

Minimum Wages and Insurance within the Firm

Adamopoulou, Effrosyni; Manaresi, Francesco; Rachedi, Omar - 2022

Minimum wages alter the allocation of firm-idiosyncratic risk across workers. To establish this result, we focus on Italy, and leverage employer-employee data matched to firm balance sheets and hand-collected wage floors. We find a relatively larger pass-through of firm-specific labor-demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083969

Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives : Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets

Rebitzer, James B. - 2010

Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139879

Authority and Incentives in Organizations

Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084675

Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy

Bertola, Giuseppe - 2013

We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071425

How Unjust! An Experimental Investigation of Supervisors' Evaluation Errors and Agents' Incentives

Marchegiani, Lucia - 2012

In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112772

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