We model decisions with respect to formality or informality for entrepreneurs in a newindustry for a developing economy. We show that informality allows a leader to explore,without significant sunk costs, the potential profitability of the industry; that is, informality maybe a stepping stone,...

We construct a simple model incorporating various urban labour market phenomena obtaining in developing economies. Our initial formulation assumes an integrated labour market and allows for entrepreneurship, self-employment and wage employment. We then introduce labour market segmentation. In...

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy's bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized,...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to quot;excessivequot; entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...

For two different regulatory standards, we examine the optimal minimum wage in a competitive labour market when the government is uncertain about supply and demand. Solutions are related to underlying supply and demand conditions, and the extent of uncertainty and of rationing efficiency. We...

We analyze how intermittent large expenditures on family ceremonies may affect an entrepreneur's investment decision in an informal enterprise. Our hypothesis is that the barrier between family and enterprise is thin and permeable. We test this hypothesis using a survey from Sénégal that...

We model decisions with respect to formality or informality for entrepreneurs in a new industry for a developing economy. We show that informality allows a leader to explore, without significant sunk costs, the potential profitability of the industry; that is, informality may be a stepping...

We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the...