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The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?

Dreher, Axel - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146478

Time to Vote?

Gibson, John - 2011

Despite the centrality of voting costs to the paradox of voting, little effort has been made to accurately measure these costs outside of a few spatially limited case studies. In this paper, we apply Geographic Information Systems (GIS) tools to validated national election survey data from New...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122114

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth - 2011

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123565

An Experimental Study of Voting with Costly Delay

Kwiek, Maksymilian - 2015

A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015019

Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds

Finan, Frederico - 2016

It is widely believed that politicians allocate public resources in ways to maximize political gains. But what is less clear is whether this comes at a cost to welfare; and if so, whether alternative electoral rules can help reduce these costs. In this paper, we address both of these questions by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001344

Voting Power and Survival : The Case of a Ruling Party

Jelnov, Artyom - 2019

In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868829

The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees

Ben-Yashar, Ruth - 2016

This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993948

When is Voting Optimal?

Ben-Yashar, Ruth - 2014

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039595

Voting in Hiring Committees : Which 'Almost' Rule is Optimal?

Baharad, Eyal - 2018

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929073

Moderating Political Extremism : Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule

Bordignon, Massimo - 2013

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility are smaller, because the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076816

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