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How Do Labor Representatives Affect Incentive Orientation of Executive Compensation?

Dyballa, Katharina - 2016

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984836

Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels and Tenure : Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

Grund, Christian - 2010

Using data on executive compensation for the German chemical industry, we investigate the relevance of two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a long term wage policy of a firm. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136492

What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009

Fabbri, Francesca - 2012

work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108264

CEO and Board Characteristics as Determinants of Private Benefits of Control : Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange

Berezinets, Irina - 2012

This paper investigates whether and how various characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards are related to the severity of corporate governance problems within firms. The latter is proxied by private benefits of control, which we measure for dual class stock firms using the voting premium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112769

Management Compensation and Firm-Level Income Inequality

Frederiksen, Anders; Poulsen, Odile M. - 2021

In recent decades, most developed countries have experienced a simultaneous increase in income inequality and management compensation. In this paper, we study the relation between management compensation and firm-level income dynamics in a general equilibrium model. Empirical estimation, of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324993

Tenure Profiles and Efficient Separation in a Stochastic Productivity Model

Buhai, Sebastian - 2006

This paper provides a new way of analyzing tenure profiles in wages, by modelling simultaneously the evolution of wages … we observe outside wages only at job start and job separation, our empirical analysis of within job wage growth is based … on expected wage growth conditional on the outside wages at both dates. Our modelling allows testing of the efficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780583

Link between Pay for Performance Incentives and Physician Payment Mechanisms : Evidence from the Diabetes Management Incentive in Ontario

Kantarevic, Jasmin - 2012

Pay for performance (P4P) incentives for physicians are generally designed as additional payments that can be paired with any existing payment mechanism such as salary, fee-for-service, and capitation. However, the link between the physician response to performance incentives and the existing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107695

Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation

Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2006

How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779052

The Dispersion of Bonus Payments within and between Firms

Grund, Christian - 2017

We explore the dispersion of bonus payments of managers within and between five large firms from the German chemical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012959667

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - 2010

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147137

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