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Keep it Simple : A Field Experiment on Information Sharing Among Strangers
Batista, Catia; Fafchamps, Marcel; Vicente, Pedro C. - 2022
SMS information campaigns are increasingly used for policy. We conduct a field experiment to study information sharing through mobile phone messages. Subjects are rural households in Mozambique who have access to mobile money. In the baseline intervention, subjects receive an SMS containing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084060
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Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency
Gautier, Pieter A. - 2011
When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not … friction affects network formation, while the second coordination friction affects network clearing. We show that those … that can arise and the number of matches on a given network. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion are inefficient in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121924
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In Search of Stars : Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents
Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno; Ule, Aljaz - 2021
This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The … experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing … private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318256
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Dynamic Incentive Contracts Under Parameter Uncertainty
Prat, Julien - 2010
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135822
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Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2010
punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can … only monitor and punish the other individuals to whom they are connected by the network. We study several non …-trivial network architectures that give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136030
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Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining
Conrads, Julian - 2011
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118529
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Truth-Telling : A Representative Assessment
Abeler, Johannes - 2012
A central assumption of the canonical cheap talk literature is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit. Recent evidence from laboratory experiments with student subjects suggests, however, that while many people do report the payoff-maximizing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099099
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Competing with Asking Prices
Lester, Benjamin R. - 2013
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422
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An Economic Analysis of Exclusion Restrictions for Instrumental Variable Estimation
van den Berg, Gerard J. - 2007
Instrumental variable estimation requires untestable exclusion restrictions. With policy effects on individual outcomes, there is typically a time interval between the moment the agent realizes that he may be exposed to the policy and the actual exposure or the announcement of the actual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012777599
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Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing
Prat, Julien - 2014
This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013058309