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A Model of Overconfidence
Weinberg, Bruce A. - 2009
People use information about their ability to choose tasks. If more challenging tasks provide more accurate information about ability, people who care about and who are risk averse over their perception of their own ability will choose tasks that are not sufficiently challenging. Overestimation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158056
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Beliefs and Actions in the Trust Game : Creating Instrumental Variables to Estimate the Causal Effect
Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. - 2010
In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's expectation about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. Recent experimental studies as well as surveys have asked participants to state their beliefs explicitly, but little is known about the causal relation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148347
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation : An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect … mechanism should – in theory – provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023778
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Two-Stage Boundedly Rational Choice Procedures : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco - 2021
We study and test a class of boundedly rational models of decision making which rely on sequential eliminative … heuristics. We formalize two sequential decision procedures, both inspired by plausible models popular among several …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317410
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Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision
Abeler, Johannes; Huffman, David; Raymond, Collin - 2023
Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347039
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Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
Sutter, Matthias - 2010
We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games …. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013148075
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Strategic Sophistication of Adolescents : Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games
Czermak, Simon - 2010
We examine the strategic sophistication of adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013141220
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Heterogeneous Productivity in Voluntary Public Good Provision : An Experimental Analysis
Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde - 2011
vary. The experiment implements two marginal return types, low and high, and uses the information that members have about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128231
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How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment
Fehrler, Sebastian - 2015
We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career …'s key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out – transparency negatively … under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023008
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Feedback in Tournaments Under Commitment Problems : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2021
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316760