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Feedback and incentives: experimental evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268675
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Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts
Parsons, Donald O. - 2011
insurance. In a limited information environment, the distribution of job displacement insurance between the two benefit types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280678
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003
different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse … identified. We show that the good searcher receives an information rent and that the bad searcher receives the minimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113
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Division of labour and directed production
Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331
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Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic
Cigno, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2009
We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269114
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On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations
Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - 2008
We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269167
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Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938
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The dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment services
Addison, John T.; Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Kuhn, Thomas - 2010
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274618
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Public and private insurance with costly transactions
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2010
We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274703
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On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse
van der Linden, Bruno; Lehmann, Etienne - 2004
functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect … rent when information is perfect. An appropriate positive rent is however needed in the second case. To implement these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276945