We propose a method to identify bounds (i.e. set identification) on the sharing rule for a general collective household consumption model. Unlike the effects of distribution factors, it is well known that the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identified without strong assumptions on...

We non-parametrically test a general collective consumption model with public consumption and externalities inside the household. We further propose a novel approach to model special cases of the general collective model. These special cases include alternative restrictions on the 'sharing rule'...

We study the labor supply dynamics of elderly couples by means of a structural collective model. The model allows for general externalities with respect to spouses? leisure. Preferences and the intrahousehold bargaining process are identified by using panel data with couples and individuals who...

We apply the collective consumption model of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) to analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. The model focuses on individual preferences, a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple, and a sharing rule...

We propose a novel structural method to empirically identify economies of scale in household consumption. We assume collective households with consumption technologies that define the public and private nature of expenditures through Barten scales. Our method recovers the technology by solely...

We compare the empirical performance of unitary and collective labor supply models, using representative data from the Dutch DNB Household Survey. We conduct a nonparametric analysis that avoids the distortive impact of an erroneously specified functional form for the preferences and/or the...

We propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005). In our model, adults' individual preferences do not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods. They also depend on...

It is unlikely that husbands and wives always agree on exactly what public goods to buy. Nor do they necessarily agree on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a non-cooperative setting...

Do individuals divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the attractiveness of new matches in the marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of the household and a rich panel dataset from Malawi. We propose a model of the household with consumption, production and...

The implementation of Gary Becker's (1965) time allocation model is hampered by the fact that values of the different time uses are usually not observed. In practice, one often assumes that the value of time is uniform across time uses by using market wages. This approach implies a fundamental...