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Driving forces behind informal sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2005

theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted … between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own … the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590

Guilt from promise-breaking and trust in markets for expert services: Theory and experiment

Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - 2010

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269892

Social preferences in childhood and adolescence: A large-scale experiment

Sutter, Matthias; Feri, Francesco; Kocher, Martin G.; … - 2010

Social preferences have been shown to be an important determinant of economic decision making for many adults. We present a large-scale experiment with 883 children and adolescents, aged eight to seventeen years. Participants make decisions in eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks, allowing us...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269867

Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes

Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora - 2013

This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319464

Institutions and contract enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268924

Implicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David - 2010

We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269827

Reference points and effort provision

Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - 2009

A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269296

Other-regarding preferences and leadership styles

Kocher, Martin G.; Pogrebna, Ganna; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether and to what extent other-regarding preferences of team leaders influence their leadership style in choice under risk. We find that leaders who prefer efficiency or report high levels of selfishness are more likely to exercise an autocratic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269301

The impact of distributional preferences on (experimental) markets for expert services

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2009

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269558

Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games

Sutter, Matthias; Czermak, Simon; Feri, Francesco - 2010

We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269696