-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero …, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred …

experiment based on a game in the first stage of which subjects can voluntarily contribute to the funding of a collective good …

exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal … may prefer to delegate authority over decisions to the risk-averse agent. Intuitively, for incentive reasons, the … principal may optimally want to allow the agent to reduce his risk exposure. Nevertheless, even endogenous risk may be higher …

We analyze the role of risk-sharing institutions in transitions to modern economies. Transitions requires individual …-level risk-taking in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities including using and developing new knowledge. Individual …-level, idiosyncratic risk implies that distinct risk-sharing institutions - even those providing the same level of insurance - can lead to …

of religious behaviour towards Theoi in the laboratory. The theory we test is that, when faced with uncertainty …

learn the abilities of agents. Theory suggests high first-period equilibrium effort in the hidden ability treatment but no …

We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games …