Similar Search Results

An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113

Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - 2002

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331

Legitimacy of control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268243

You don't always get what you pay for

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268396

Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic

Cigno, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2009

We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269114

On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of … health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk … health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269167

Optimal unemployment insurance for older workers

Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - 2009

This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269168

Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938

The dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment services

Addison, John T.; Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Kuhn, Thomas - 2010

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274618

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