Showing 1 - 10 of 72
In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261919
We develop a rationale for the payment by firms of a wage premium on marginal, or overtime, weekly hours. We examine wage-hours contracts within the framework of a two-period specific human capital model with asymmetric information. The wage premium serves to achieve contract efficiency. For...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262371
This paper develops and tests a new model of asymmetric information in the labour market involving employer learning. In the model, I provide theoretical conditions for the identification – based on the experience and tenure profiles of estimated returns to ability and education – of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262759
Implementing performance pay requires that workers' output be measured. When measurement costs differ among firms, those with a measurement cost advantage choose to implement performance pay. They attract the best workers, and both the level and variability of compensation are higher at these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268459
This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269147
Wage determination under asymmetric information generates inefficiencies due to excess turnover. Severance pay and layoff taxes can improve efficiency. We show that inefficient separations can even be fully removed with fixed separation taxes in the case where the relevant private information is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269525
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276700
Immigrant workers and their labor force participation in host countries have received critical attention in all concerned disciplines, principally owing to its strong implications for well-being of natives. The ageing population in many rich countries and several related and unrelated issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278687
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274618
This paper adds to the current literature on incomplete contracting that argues that deviating from a complete information, transaction-cost free environment may be may generate valuable insights. We achieve this by assuming bargaining with asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262108