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Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268396

Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts

Parsons, Donald O. - 2011

Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280678

On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2003

In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262723

Job assignments under moral hazard: the Peter Principle revisited

Koch, Alexander K.; Nafziger, Julia - 2007

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often place employees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second, demotions are extremely rare. Why do organizations not correct 'wrong' promotion decision? This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268113

An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113

Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - 2002

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331

Legitimacy of control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268243

Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic

Cigno, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2009

We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269114

On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of … health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk … health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269167

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