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Using Response Times to Measure Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking in Games
Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria L. - 2017
Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games (Rubinstein, 2007; Rubinstein, 2016). We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653246
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It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - 2003
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The gametheoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262760
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It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The gametheoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761658
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Gossip and the Efficiency of Interactions
Fehr, Dietmar; Sutter, Matthias - 2016
experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions. We let subjects play a trust game. Third parties observe … possibility of gossip is highly efficiency-increasing compared to a situation without any gossip. In two further control … treatments, we show that the mere fact of being observed by third parties cannot explain the efficiency-increasing effect of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479222
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Field Experiments in Economics: Palgrave Entry
List, John A.; Reiley, David - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
Field experiments occupy a middle ground between laboratory experiments and naturally occurring field data. The idea is to perform a controlled experiment that captures important characteristics of the real world. Relative to traditional empirical economics, field experiments provide an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822074
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Dynamics of Intrahousehold Bargaining
Andaluz, Joaquín; Marcén, Miriam; Molina, José Alberto - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822573
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The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822636
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The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations
Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822647
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Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods
Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals' cooperation preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a novel test as to whether there are "types" of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822657
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The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832