Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of … mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which … in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the …

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of … mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which … in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the …

unincentivized local monitoring. We use these experimental impacts to undertake a detailed cost-benefit analysis and conclude, even …

correlates with perceptions of corruption. We find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy. …

correlates with perceptions of corruption. We find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy. …

performance appraisalsystems, monitoring by supervisors, autonomy to organize the work) and individuals’inclination to trust …