Showing 1 - 10 of 141
contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning … contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD would not be distortionary or redistributive. If contracting frictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277255
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293168
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293214
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning … contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD would not be distortionary or redistributive. If contracting frictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103260
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632999
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face … selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions under which the UI agency should always offer separating contracts are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113
The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469
The paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure. A new econometric model, the Probit-Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors, describes the data better than existing count data models. Moreover, it has an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262522
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331