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Finance and Growth at the Firm Level: Evidence from SBA Loans

Brown, J. David; Earle, John S. - 2015

We analyze linked databases on all Small Business Administration (SBA) loans, on all SBA lenders, and on all U … lenders. The estimation results imply an increase of 3-4 jobs for each million dollars of loans, suggesting that credit …-county versus non-SBA county-industry control firms. Finally, for loans issued over the 1992-2007 period, we estimate total job …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307476

An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113

Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - 2002

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262469

Health Care Reform and the Number of Doctor Visits - An Econometric Analysis

Winkelmann, Rainer - 2001

The paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure. A new econometric model, the Probit-Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors, describes the data better than existing count data models. Moreover, it has an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262522

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331

Legitimacy of control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principal-agent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268243

You don't always get what you pay for

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007

Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268396

Outside income and moral hazard: the elusive quest for good politicians

Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; Naticchioni, … - 2008

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268534

Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic

Cigno, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2009

We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269114

On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of … health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk … health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269167

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