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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - 2003

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262113

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331

Optimal family policy in the presence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are stochastic

Cigno, Alessandro; Luporini, Annalisa - 2009

We examine the second-best family policy under the assumption that both the number and the future earning capacities of the children born to a couple are random variables with probability distributions conditional on unobservable parental actions. Potential parents take their decisions without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269114

On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of … health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk … health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269167

Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938

The dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment services

Addison, John T.; Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Kuhn, Thomas - 2010

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274618

Public and private insurance with costly transactions

Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - 2010

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274703

On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse

van der Linden, Bruno; Lehmann, Etienne - 2004

This paper revisits the normative properties of search-matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276945

Producer protection legislation and termination damages in the presence of contracting frictions

Wu, Steven Y. - 2009

This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277255

How to deal with covert child labour, and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country

Cigno, Alessandro - 2011

As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278558

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