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price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by … interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268857
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences (values), material or other explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards (norms). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals' behaviors and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282313
In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in … reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation … employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401783
Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It seems natural to suppose that greater transparency would enhance incentives. Therefore, it is puzzling that team production often lacks transparency about individual contributions despite negligible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267330
Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267497
In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetric learning about agents' abilities provides the first principal with an informational advantage and has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276192
We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278382
reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011494319
We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426425