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A model of overconfidence
Weinberg, Bruce A. - 2009
People use information about their ability to choose tasks. If more challenging tasks provide more accurate information about ability, people who care about and who are risk averse over their perception of their own ability will choose tasks that are not sufficiently challenging. Overestimation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269111
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Identifying conflict and violence in micro-level surveys
Brück, Tilman; Justino, Patricia; Verwimp, Philip; … - 2010
, and across time, how individuals, households and communities are affected by violent conflict. The report provides an … data-bases used to operationalize the variables of interest and discuss the channels linking violent conflict to individual … variables that allow researchers to analyze the welfare effects of violent conflict across countries and across time. We develop …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272662
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Ethnic fragmentation, conflict, displaced persons and human trafficking: An empirical analysis
Akee, Randall K. Q.; Basu, Arnab K.; Chau, Nancy H.; … - 2010
fragmentation and conflict on international trafficking through internal and international displacements. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274570
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Who remits? the case of Nicaragua
Naufal, George S. - 2007
status and the level of education of the head of the household both affect remittances. The decision to participate in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268241
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The Wage Expectations of European College Students
Brunello, Giorgio; Lucifora, Claudio - 2001
Expected earnings and expected returns to education are seen by labor economists as a major determinant of educational attainment. In spite of this, the empirical knowledge about expectations and their formation is scarce. In this paper we report the results of the first systematic study of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262505
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A Model of Overconfidence
Weinberg, Bruce A. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
People use information about their ability to choose tasks. If more challenging tasks provide more accurate information about ability, people who care about and who are risk averse over their perception of their own ability will choose tasks that are not sufficiently challenging. Overestimation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005039646
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The Wage Expectations of European College Students
Brunello, Giorgio; Lucifora, Claudio; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2001
Expected earnings and expected returns to education are seen by labor economists as a major determinant of educational attainment. In spite of this, the empirical knowledge about expectations and their formation is scarce. In this paper we report the results of the first systematic study of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703334
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Divide et Impera: Negotiating with a Stakeholder
Manzini, Paola - 2002
In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262827
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Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate
Epstein, Gil S. - 2002
We introduce the idea that informational cascades can explain the observed regularity that emigrants from the same locations also tend to choose the same foreign locations. Thus informational cascades generate herd behavior. Herd behavior is compared with the network externalities explanation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262802
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Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems: theory and experimental evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268409