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Bribery, Hold-Up and Bureaucratic Structure
Bennett, John; Rablen, Matthew D. - 2018
We analyze the provision of infrastructure by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but puts some weight on domestic welfare. The investor may pay a bribe in return for a higher provisional contract price. After the investment has been sunk, the bureaucracy may hold up the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873597
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Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment
Zylberberg, André; Cahuc, Pierre - 1999
We analyze how wage setting institutions and job-security provisions interact on unemployment. The assumption that wages are renegotiated by mutual agreement only is introduced in a matching model with endogenous job destruction – la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in order to get wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262316
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Redundancy Payments, Incomplete Labor Contracts, Unemployment and Welfare
Cahuc, Pierre; Zylberberg, André - 1999
It is frequently argued that pure government-mandated severance transfers by the employer to the worker have neither employment nor welfare effect because they can be offset by private transfers from the worker to the employer. In this paper, using a dynamic search and matching model a la...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262317
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Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816561
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - 2011
such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our … the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that … renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282296
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Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment
Cahuc, Pierre; Zylberberg, André - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 1999
high redundancy transfers influence employment. Moreover, the assumption of renegotiation by mutual agreement allows us to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762387
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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our … the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that … renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874
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Redundancy Payments, Incomplete Labor Contracts, Unemployment and Welfare
Cahuc, Pierre; Zylberberg, André - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 1999
It is frequently argued that pure government-mandated severance transfers by the employer to the worker have neither employment nor welfare effect because they can be offset by private transfers from the worker to the employer. In this paper, using a dynamic search and matching model à la...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703431