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The big carrot: high stake incentives revisited
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - 2008
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268759
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The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited
Brañas Garza, Pablo; García Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823002
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Punishing Free-Riders : How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2004
Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding … strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is … rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups. However, hindrances to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262078
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Mutual monitoring in teams: theory and experimental evidence on the importance of reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - 2006
willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267388
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Group membership, competition, and altruistic versus antisocial punishment: Evidence from randomly assigned army groups
Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan; Sutter, … - 2010
punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to … prisoner's dilemma game with in-group as opposed to out-group members. They also use a costly punishment option to selectively … stronger in-group cooperation, but also a qualitative change in punishment: punishment becomes antisocial, harming cooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274651
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Network architecture and mutual monitoring in public goods experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - 2010
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278606
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The effect of religion on cooperation and altruistic punishment: Experimental evidence from public goods experiments
Akay, Alpaslan; Karabulut, Gökhan; Martinsson, Peter - 2011
altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one … punishment among individuals during Ramadan, even when the degree of their religiosity varied. However, less religious people did …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282506
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The Effect of Religion on Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Experiments
Akay, Alpaslan; Karabulut, Gökhan; Martinsson, Peter - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one … punishment among individuals during Ramadan, even when the degree of their religiosity varied. However, less religious people did …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369116
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Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693833
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Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703699