We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

In the context of the Beckerian theory of marriage, when men and women match on a single-dimensional index that is the …

We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage … market is characterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra …-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model, we are able to …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse foruniversity admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of prioritymatching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant …

In the context of the Beckerian theory of marriage, when men and women match on a single-dimensional index that is the …

, matching in asymmetric marriage markets induces spousal cooperation and specialization. …Can households make efficient choices? The fact that cohabitation and marriage are partnerships for joint production … household choices are made efficiently or not, there does not yet exist an attempt to identify the marriage market and household …

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

Recruiting agents, or "programs" costly screen “applicants” in matching processes, and congestion in a market increases … programs; however, they may harm match quality. In a multiple-elicitation experiment conducted in a real-life matching market …

stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption … patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is …

stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption … patterns. We start by defining a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is …