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Add-on pricing, naive consumers, and the hidden welfare costs of education
Kosfeld, Michael; Schüwer, Ulrich - 2011
Previous research shows that firms shroud high add-on prices in competitive markets with naive consumers leading to inefficiency. We analyze the effects of regulatory intervention via educating naive consumers on equilibrium prices and welfare. Our model allows firms to shroud, unshroud, or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282162
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Information and competition entry
Ewers, Mara - 2012
This paper studies the influence of information on entry choices in a competition with a controlled laboratory … experiment. We investigate whether information provision attracts mainly high productivity individuals and reduces competition … failure, where competition failure occurs when a subject loses the competition because the opponent holds a higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282257
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The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
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The Effect of Self-Awareness and Competition on Dishonesty
Çıbık, Ceren Bengü; Sgroi, Daniel - 2021
of our core tasks to further explore the interactions between self-awareness, (dis)honesty and competition. We also test …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012597402
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Information and Competition Entry
Ewers, Mara - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
This paper studies the influence of information on entry choices in a competition with a controlled laboratory … experiment. We investigate whether information provision attracts mainly high productivity individuals and reduces competition … failure, where competition failure occurs when a subject loses the competition because the opponent holds a higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279246
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It Hurts to Ask
Benabou, Roland; Jaroszewicz, Ania; Loewenstein, George - 2022
We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426425
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The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832
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Strategic ignorance in bargaining
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - 2011
In his classic article An Essay on Bargaining Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282588
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Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
In his classic article "An Essay on Bargaining" Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371183
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Guilt from promise-breaking and trust in markets for expert services: Theory and experiment
Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - 2010
We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269892