Showing 1 - 10 of 649
pressure. Nonetheless, when facing a penalty incentive scheme these individuals are more likely to choose to work with strict … term limits, suggesting that penalty contracts might generate adverse selection problems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012270152
We develop a formula for the optimal size of a joint savings association between individuals who share the same financial goal and who can save towards that goal at the same rate. Our motivating example and the core of our analysis is a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA). We measure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013351922
their own, but reward significantly evaluations exceeding their own. Our analysis exploits data from a principal-agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012005916
, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps and income taxes can help restore balance in agents' incentives and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293214
We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329084
We investigate whether and how social ties affect performance in teams by implementing a field experiment in which a sample of undergraduate students are randomly assigned to either teams composed by friends or teams composed by individuals not linked by friendship relationships. Students...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559685
This paper studies the role of job search assistance programs in optimal welfare-to-work programs. The analysis is based on a framework, that allows for endogenous choice of benefit types and levels, wage taxes or subsidies, and activation measures such as monitoring and job search assistance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269430
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938
contract depends on the average type attracted by the respective principal - can solve the equilibrium existence problem, even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276700
PPL damages vis-à-vis expected damages under existing contract law. This study clarifies the conditions under which PPLD …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277255