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Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
von Siemens, Ferdinand; Kosfeld, Michael - 2009
on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276700
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Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
von Siemens, Ferdinand; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976877
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Bonus culture: Competitive pay, screening, and multitasking
Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be much larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293214
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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be much larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
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The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
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Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2010
-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269521
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Black Sheep and Walls of Silence
Roider, Andreas; Muehlheusser, Gerd - 2004
In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261919
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Employer Learning and Schooling-Related Statistical Discrimination in Britain
Galindo-Rueda, Fernando - 2003
This paper develops and tests a new model of asymmetric information in the labour market involving employer learning. In the model, I provide theoretical conditions for the identification – based on the experience and tenure profiles of estimated returns to ability and education – of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262759
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Asymmetric information in the labor market, immigrants and contract menu
Kar, Saibal; Saha, Bibhas Chandra - 2011
Immigrant workers and their labor force participation in host countries have received critical attention in all concerned disciplines, principally owing to its strong implications for well-being of natives. The ageing population in many rich countries and several related and unrelated issues...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278687
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Worker self-selection and the profits from cooperation
Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2008
We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276699