than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …

rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …

empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should … price or all-pay raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated … by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the …

that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an …

at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … prior to the auction; whereas in the "Sell-It-Now" format, it is the buyer. Both formats are extensively used in online and … offline markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no …

This paper's objective is to design a laboratory experiment to explore the effect of ambiguity on a subject's search …

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a first …

prospects in a laboratory experiment. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk seeking behavior for small probabilities …