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The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
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Behavioral foundations of microcredit: Experimental and survey evidence from rural India
Bauer, Michal; Chytilová, Julie; Morduch, Jonathan - 2010
experimental measures of time discounting and risk aversion for villagers in south India to highlight behavioral features of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269753
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Are women more credit constrained? Experimental evidence on gender and microenterprise returns
de Mel, Suresh; McKenzie, David; Woodruff, Christopher - 2008
In a recent randomized experiment we found mean returns to capital of between 5 and 6 percent per month in Sri Lankan microenterprises, much higher than market interest rates. But returns were found to be much higher among men than among women, and indeed were not different from zero for women....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275824
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Black Sheep and Walls of Silence
Roider, Andreas; Muehlheusser, Gerd - 2004
In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261919
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Why Do Firms Pay an Overtime Premium?
Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yue - 2000
We develop a rationale for the payment by firms of a wage premium on marginal, or overtime, weekly hours. We examine wage-hours contracts within the framework of a two-period specific human capital model with asymmetric information. The wage premium serves to achieve contract efficiency. For...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262371
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Employer Learning and Schooling-Related Statistical Discrimination in Britain
Galindo-Rueda, Fernando - 2003
This paper develops and tests a new model of asymmetric information in the labour market involving employer learning. In the model, I provide theoretical conditions for the identification – based on the experience and tenure profiles of estimated returns to ability and education – of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262759
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Performance pay, sorting, and outsourcing
Henneberger, Fred; Sousa-Poza, Alfonso; Ziegler, Alexandre - 2007
Implementing performance pay requires that workers' output be measured. When measurement costs differ among firms, those with a measurement cost advantage choose to implement performance pay. They attract the best workers, and both the level and variability of compensation are higher at these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268459
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Wage-hours contracts, overtime working and premium pay
Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yue - 2008
This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269147
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Layoff costs and efficiency with asymmetric information
Delacroix, Alain; Wasmer, Etienne - 2009
Wage determination under asymmetric information generates inefficiencies due to excess turnover. Severance pay and layoff taxes can improve efficiency. We show that inefficient separations can even be fully removed with fixed separation taxes in the case where the relevant private information is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269525
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Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
von Siemens, Ferdinand; Kosfeld, Michael - 2009
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276700