Showing 1 - 10 of 202
many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees … of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a model with a supervisor, who has preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268730
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …, reduces quality, and increases in-pocket income of team managers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282221
In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268559
agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that … the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269064
resource management and personnel economics and may also contribute to the debate about incentives and organizational …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282338
number of managers reporting directly to the CEO doubled, the growth was driven primarily by functional managers rather than … general managers. Using panel data on senior management positions, we explore the relationship between changes in executive …This paper shows that top management structures in large US firms radically changed since the mid-1980s. While the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287681
Holmström?s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262147
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268002
.e., those with the highest scores of Machiavellianism are most likely to be managers. It also suggests that the direction of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014377264
This paper estimates racial differences in the retention probability, pay and performance of NBA coaches over the 1996-2003 period. Using a hazard function approach, I find small and statistically insignificant racial differences in the exit hazard, conditional on team performance, team payroll,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261874