Showing 1 - 10 of 22
Interviewing is a decisive stage of most processes that match candidates to firms or organizations. This paper studies how and why the interview assessment of a candidate depends on the other candidates seen by the same evaluator. We leverage novel administrative data covering about 29,000...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012882375
Most firms rely on subjective evaluations by supervisors to assess their employees' performance. This article discusses the implementation of such appraisal processes, exploring the use of multiple research methods such as the analysis of personnel records, survey data, and lab and field...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307497
We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873585
The quality of subjective performance evaluation is dependent on the incentive structures faced by evaluators, in particular on how they are monitored and themselves evaluated. Figure skating competitions provide a unique opportunity to study subjective evaluation. This paper develops and tests...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262009
We empirically investigate possible distortions in subjective performance evaluations. A key hypothesis is that evaluations are more upward biased the closer the social ties between supervisor and appraised employee. We test this hypothesis with a company data set from a call center organization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269802
We study the determinants of biases in subjective performance evaluations in an MTurk experiment to test the implications of a standard formal framework of rational subjective evaluations. In the experiment, subjects in the role of workers work on a real effort task. Subjects in the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426345
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319459
It is often claimed that supervisors do not differentiate enough between high and low performing employees when evaluating performance. The purpose of this paper is to study the incentive effects of this behavior empirically. We first show in a simple model that the perceived degree of past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282509
Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales. In particular, using a large administrative dataset...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141319
It is often claimed that supervisors do not differentiate enough between high and low performing employees when evaluating performance. The purpose of this paper is to study the incentive effects of this behavior empirically. We first show in a simple model that the perceived degree of past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359866